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Examining the Role of the Crop Insurance Selling Agent 
The United States Department of Agriculture, Risk 
Management Agency (RMA) partners with private 
insurance companies to deliver the federal crop 
insurance program through agents who sell poli-
cies directly to producers. The government subsi-
dizes producers in the form of premium discounts 
and reimburses private insurance companies for 
administrative and operating (A&O) costs. The 
government provides further assistance to the in-
dustry by offering a cooperative reinsurance 
agreement that reduces loss exposure for insur-
ance companies (Appel and Borba, 2009). 
Subsidization of private market players may facili-
tate rent-seeking behavior—efforts to capture larg-
er shares of tax dollars devoted to the program—
especially in the settings of asymmetric infor-
mation, moral hazard, and adverse selection 
which typically characterize crop insurance mar-
kets (Glauber, 2012; Lusk, 2016; Smith, Glauber, 
and Dismukes, 2016). Ker and Ergun (2007) show 
that insurance companies can use private infor-
mation in the reinsurance market to generate ex-
cess returns, which go uncaptured by the govern-
ment’s premium-setting mechanism. Similarly, 
Coble, Dismukes, and Glauber (2007) show that 
crop insurance companies take individual policy-
holder characteristics into account when allocat-
ing policies to reinsurance funds—ceding high 
risk policies to the government and retaining safe 
policies for themselves. Rejesus et al. (2004) con-
sider the role of the selling agent and find evidence 
of collusion between crop insurance agents, pro-
ducers, and insurance adjusters. Our work extends 
the cropinsuranceliterature by investigating the  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  3-27-20 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . ..  *126.00  *  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  198.82  179.59  166.36 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  170.00  146.74  139.67 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  228.20  206.34  255.07 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  *  *  * 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79.80  64.05  75.76 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  381.53  160.41  162.63 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  140.93  424.41  433.70 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4.10  4.10  4.44 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  3.44  3.64  3.04 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  7.92  8.36  8.19 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.48  5.74  5.38 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.26  3.18  2.96 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  *  *  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  112.50  *  90.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  *  95.00  85.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  161.50  141.58  198.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47.50  50.67  54.37 
 ⃰No Market          
total compensation—premium commission 
(volume incentive) plus book-of-business value 
(quality incentive)—which may not maximize 
producer outcomes. In this context, we define 
agent rent-seeking as pursuing excess profit by 
selling coverage that would not be chosen by the 
producer in the absence of agent influence. This 
definition of agent rent-seeking does not specifi-
cally include the case of collusion between pro-
ducers and insurance adjusters (Rejesus et al., 
2004).  
When choosing a crop insurance product, farm-
ers select from a menu of options including the 
coverage level, policy type (individual [revenue 
vs. yield] vs. area protection), unit structure, and 
price election. Insurance product characteristic 
combinations can easily number in the hundreds, 
making many producers reliant on agent exper-
tise(Schnitkey and Sherrick, 2017). Agents with 
large market shares or few competitors may take 
advantage of these and other information asym-
metries to maximize their compensation. More 
comprehensive insurance policies carry higher 
premiums which increase agent compensation. 
Alternatively, if an agent expects an insurance 
customer to suffer large losses, the quality incen-
tive may lead the agent to minimize the insurance 
company’s exposure.  
We examine how agent market share and the 
market concentration of agents influencethe crop 
insurance contract decisions of producers. We 
model the interaction between a representative 
crop insurance agent and producer and examine 
how competition among agents impacts their 
selling behavior. We hypothesize that the effect of 
a decrease in agent competition on producers de-
pends on the agent’s beliefs about the producer’s 
risk of loss and the agent compensation mecha-
nism, which may vary by region. We test these 
hypotheses using crop insurance contract level 
data from five states with different growing con-
ditions and crops: Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
Montana, and Washington. For each state, we 
estimate the relationship between measures of 
agent market competition (market share and 
market concentration) and the insurance cover-
age choices of producers (policy coverage level, 
premium, and insured liability). For our  
potential for selling agents to influence producers’ 
choices of insurance coverage.  
The Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) estab-
lishes the guidelines under which the government, pri-
vate insurance companies, and crop insurance agents 
operate and interact. Authorized private insurance 
companies sell and service insurance products and 
share underwriting gains and losses withthe Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). The government 
provided A&O reimbursement, calculated as a pro-
portion of total premiums, covers agent commissions, 
adjustor costs, and regulatory compliance. Insurance 
companies allocate their total premiums net of A&O 
subsidies, or net book premium, between two FCIC 
reinsurance funds: the Assigned Risk Fund, in which 
insurance companies cede most of their risk exposure 
to the government, and the Commercial Fund, where 
insurance companies retain more risk but enjoy a larg-
er share of any underwriting gains. Crop insurance 
agents act as intermediaries between farmers and in-
surance companies by procuring policies from pro-
ducers and selling their portfolio of contracts, referred 
to as the book of business, to authorized insurance 
companies.  
Agent compensation is proportional to the total 
amount of insurance transferred to insurance compa-
nies (total premiums), though the percentage of pre-
mium transferred (commission rate) may be influ-
enced by the actuarial value of the book of business as 
determined by underwriting gains or losses (Rejesus et 
al., 2004; Walters et al., 2010). Hence, the agents’ in-
centives include the maximization of premiums col-
lected from farmers and optimization of the actuarial 
performance of the policies they sell to insurance com-
panies. We refer to these motivations as the volume 
incentive (premiums collected) and the quality incen-
tive (actuarial performance). 
The SRA restricts agent behavior in two important 
ways. First, neither agents nor insurance companies 
can influence the premium for a given policy type un-
der penalty of being banned from the industry (Pearcy 
and Smith, 2015). Second, an agent operating in a state 
must sell any approved policy to a producer who re-
quests it. Agents cannot compete with other agents on 
the basis of premium price or refuse the business of 
high-risk farmers (Glauber, 2004). However, agents 
may pursue rents by writing contracts for insurance 
products and coverage levels that maximize the agents’  
The relative power of crop insurance agents to crop 
insurance companies may partially explain the weak 
influence of agents over producers found in this pa-
per. Agents—particularly those with loyal custom-
ers—can shop around their books of business to in-
surance companies who attract agents with profit-
sharing agreements. Given that the underwriting 
gains or lossesof insurance companies are calculated 
at the state level, as well as the reinsurance channels 
and A&O cost-reimbursements made available to 
crop insurance companies by the federal govern-
ment, the actuarial performance of any one agent’s 
book of business may not be a significant factor in 
their compensation. Moreover, production shocks 
such as drought or excess precipitation are typically 
experienced on a large scale. Variation in risk be-
tween agents’ books of business in a single time peri-
od will be less important than year-to-year variation 
in a company’s state-wide underwriting gains.  
The policy implications drawn from our findings can 
be summarized as follows: the influence of crop in-
surance agents over the decisions of producers is 
driven both by the incentives provided by insurance 
companies and policymakers and in small part by 
the level of competition among agents. Policymakers 
wishing to improve the performance of the federal 
crop insurance program for various stakeholders 
should consider both forces. 
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analysis, we focus on the producer coverage level 
choice as this decision directly influences the 
amount of liability transfer and therefore potential 
indemnities and premiums.  
Discussion and Implications 
We model the interaction between a representative 
crop insurance agent and producer.Using a com-
prehensive unit level dataset covering over 400,000 
individual crop insurance contracts across five 
states, we test the impact of agent market share and 
agent market concentration on the coverage choices 
of producers. We hypothesize that market competi-
tion affects an agent’s ability to influence the insur-
ance decisions of producers and that the direction 
of the effect depends on the producer’s risk level 
and the importance of the quality incentive for 
agents. 
In general, we find that both agent market share 
and market concentration are associated with high-
er coverage levels, policy premiums, and insured 
liability but the economic magnitude of these effects 
is small, suggesting limited market influence by 
agents. Agent market shares are positively correlat-
ed with insurance coverage in Iowa, Nebraska, and 
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Small positive relationships between insurance cov-
erage and agent market shares and concentrations 
point to the existence of a weak volume incentive 
for insurance agents. Evidence that agents distin-
guish between high and low-risk producers, and 
therefore that the quality incentive matters for 
agents, is limited and not consistent across loca-
tions.  
The incentives of crop insurance agents have impli-
cations for taxpayers who subsidize the federal crop 
insurance program. A mechanism through which 
agents can benefit taxpayers depends on insurance 
companies rewarding agents with high commission 
rates for policies that contribute to underwriting 
gains, i.e. the quality incentive must be meaningful 
for agents. Where agent commissions do not reflect 
actuarial performance, or when the volume incen-
tive dominates, limiting competition could hurt 
taxpayers by incentivizing agents to raise coverage 
and risk exposure. However, our results indicate 
that marginal changes in agent competition are un-
likely to produce these effects on a large scale.  
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